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Abstrat
Using Spanish data from European Union Household Panel Survey corresponding to
2001, we find that the incidence and the consequences, monetary and non-monetary, are
different for the job-worker qualification and education mismatches. In fact, only 36%
of workers have the same type of fit under both criterions of classification. Additionally,
the qualification mismatches have worse consequences for workers than education
mismatches. Specifically, the monetary consequences are neutrals for overqualified
workers, but negatives for underqualified workers, while the wage of educational
mismatched workers is not significantly different of those who have similar
characteristics and are accurately match in terms of formal education. However, the
overeducated workers earn higher wages than their well-matched co-workers and the
wage penalization for one year of undereducation is lower than the reward for one year
of required education. On the other hand, the analysis of the non-monetary
consequences, by means of job satisfaction, shows that the qualification mismatched
workers have lower probability of being completely satisfied than those who are
accurately match in terms of qualification, while the effects of education mismatch
situations on job satisfaction are no significant. However, among similar jobs, the years
of educational mismatch can have an effect even positive on job satisfaction.
I. Introduction
The abilities, skills, attitudes and knowledge possessed by workers, which is
their qualification, may be lower or higher than those required in their jobs. When this
happens, the worker is said to be mismatched in qualification: underqualified, when
his/her qualification is below that required in his/her job, and overqualified, when that
exceeds the requirement.
In the economic literature, a worker’s level of formal education is often used as a
proxy for his/her level of qualification because the latter is more difficult to identify and
measure. Indeed, a number of papers treat qualification mismatch and education
mismatch as equivalent phenomena, as in Hersch (1991, 1995), Groot (1996), Battu,
Belfield and Sloane (1999), Ng (2001), and Frenette (2004), among others.
Although education is not the only mechanism that promotes and develops workers
qualification, understood as a set of human capital competences, the literature focused
specifically on qualification mismatches is rather scarce. Additionally, most papers on
labor market mismatches address only the pecuniary consequences of education
mismatches, as shown in reviews by Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000a), Hartog
(2000) and Rubb (2003a), while the monetary effects of qualification mismatches, and
the non-monetary consequences of both types of mismatches have been seldom
explored.  For this reason, this paper is aimed at clarifying this issue by analyzing both
the monetary and non-monetary consequences for workers of both education and
qualification mismatches in the Spanish labor market.  By doing this, we will show that
the analysis of education mismatches as proxy for qualification mismatches may be not
accurate, and may yield misleading results since they are two separate labor-market
phenomena.
The rest of the paper is as follows.  Section two describes the data and evaluates the
incidence of both education and qualification mismatches in the Spanish labor market.
In section three, the monetary effects of education and qualification mismatches are
estimated using diverse wage equations. In section four, their non-monetary effects are
addressed through the estimation of job satisfaction equations.  Finally, section five
summarizes the main results and develops the conclusions and implications from the
analysis.
II. Data and incidence of mismatches in the Spanish labor market
In this investigation we use Spanish data from the European Union
Household Survey Panel (EUHSP) corresponding to 2001.
In the sample, we include workers aged 16-65 years, working at least 15 hours per
week in their main job, and exclude trainees and all those who are not remunerated, as
well as those workers with missing values in the key variables. The  sample includes
4,186 valid records for analysis. Table 1 shows the statistical description of the sample
used in this investigation.
To determine the incidence of qualification mismatches, we use workers' self-
assessments by answering two items within the EUHSP questionnaire:
i) "Did your studies or your education provide you with the knowledge required to
perform your current job?"
ii) "Do you think your knowledge or your personal capacities would allow you to
perform a more qualified job?"
As shown in figure 1, respondents answering in the affirmative to both questions are
classified as overqualified, those who answer affirmatively to the first question and
negatively to the second one are classified as accurately qualified, and finally, those
answering negatively to the first question are classified as underqualified, irrespective of
their answer to the second question.
To identify workers’ situation regarding the education match, we use the so-called
‘modal procedure’1 proposed by Kiker, Santos and De Oliveira (1997).  Under this
criterion, the level of education required by a given job is the modal level of education
among workers with similar jobs. Thus, a worker is accurately matched in education,
overeducated or undereducated when his/her own level of education is equal, higher or
lower, respectively, than the modal level within his/her occupation.
Table 2 shows that the marginal distributions of education and qualification match
differ noticeably, and their joint distribution reveals that both classifications are
inconsistent.  In fact, only 36% of workers are consistently classified under both criteria.
                                                          
1 The occupational classification used is two-digit ISCO88.
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Figure 1. Identification of  qualification mismatches
Moreover, Badillo-Amador, Garcia-Sanchez and Vila (2005) found that the statistical
association between both types of matches is very low. Consequently, education and
qualification mismatches are two different phenomena that coexist in the labor market,
and should not be treated as equivalent. This fact motivates that the analysis of the
monetary and non-monetary consequences of education and qualification mismatches in
the labor market should be developed separately for both types of phenomena.
III. Monetary consequences of labor market mismatches in Spain
A. Background
The analysis of the monetary consequences of educational mismatches has generated a
body of recent economic literature; to the contrary, the consequences of qualification
mismatches have received much less attention by researchers. This asymmetry in the
volume of scientific production is mainly due to the difficulties associated with the
identification and quantification of the accuracy of the match between workers and jobs
in terms of qualification.
Regarding, the monetary consequences of qualification mismatches, we highlight the
papers by Allen and van der Velden (2001) and Green and McIntosh (2002), which find
that overqualified workers earn lower wages than workers with similar characteristics
who are accurately qualified; however, underqualified workers earn wages neither
higher nor lower than well-matched workers.  On the other hand, Di Pietro and Urwin
(2006) analyses the wage effects of overqualification, but in contrast to the previous
studies this does not use an indicator for the underqualification, but the sign of the effect
of the overqualification on wages is the same as in preceding researches2.
On the other hand, realizing a review of the literature on the monetary consequences
of educational mismatches, we draw two main conclusions. The first one is that
educational mismatches explain part of the observable differences in wages among
workers with the same level of formal education. More precisely, overeducated workers
face wage penalties, and undereducated workers earn wage premium compared with
well-matched workers with the same level of formal education. This finding, was
initially reported by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), such as that was well discussed and
argued by Cohn (1992), and Gill and Solberg (1992). Similar results were found later
among others by Sicherman (1991), Alba-Ramírez (1993), Cohn and Khan (1995),
Kiker, Santos and De Oliveira (1997), Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2000), Cohn and Ng
(2000), Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Bauer (2002), Rubb (2003b), and Frenette (2004).
The second conclusion that we draw from the literature on the monetary consequences
of educational mismatches is that these explain wage differentials among workers with
the same type of job, since the rate of return to one-year education depends on the
education match situation. Specifically, the years of overeducation have a positive rate
of return, although it is lower than that corresponding to the years of required education,
and the years of undereducation have a negative rate of return.  These results were
found initially by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and confirmed later by Hartog and
Oosterbeek (1988), Sicherman (1991), Alba-Ramírez (1993), Cohn and Khan (1995),
                                                          
2 The terminology used in this piece of research is different of that used in Allen and Van der Velden
(2001), Green and McIntosh (2002) and Di Pietro and Urwin (2006). In fact, these utilise the terms over-
skill or skill underutilisation and under-skill to refer to the situations that in this study are identified,
respectively, as overqualification and underqualification.
Kiker, Santos and De Oliveira (1997), Sloane, Battu and Seaman (1999), Cohn and Ng
(2000), Daly, Büchel and Duncan (2000), Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000b),
Ng (2001), Bauer (2002), Rubb (2003a), and Groenelveld and Hartog (2004), among
others.
B. Models
In this paper, we begin the analysis of the monetary consequences of qualification and
education mismatches examining wage differences among workers with similar
characteristics, including the same level of formal education. To do so, we estimate the
wage equation 1 related to qualification mismatch, and the equation 2, which is similar
to the one proposed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), related to educational mismatch:
(1)                                        iiiioi X'UQOQLnW εββββ ++++= 21
(2)                                       iiiioi X'UEOELnW μαααα ++++= 21
where the dependent variable, lnWi, is the natural logarithm of the average hourly wage
earned by individual i; OQi and UQi are dummy variables taking a value of 1 if
individual i is, respectively, overqualified or underqualified, and a value of 0 otherwise;
OEi and UEi are dummy variables taking a value of 1 if individual i is respectively
overeducated or undereducated, and taking a value of 0 otherwise; vector Xi represents
all control variables related to personal characteristics of worker i, his/her human
capital, professional status, working career and migratory path, which are indicated in
table 13; and iε  and iμ  are random error terms.
                                                          
3 Working of hours per week is not included in vector Xi.
We estimate also two additional wage equations to explore if the rate of return to
one-year education in the Spanish labor market depends on the accuracy of the match
regarding workers’ education. The first one, equation 3a, is a classical Mincerian wage-
equation; whereas the second one, equation 3b, is similar to the one proposed by
Duncan and Hoffman (1981):
(3a)                                  iiioi X'School_yearLnW ηγγγ +++= 1
(3b)          iiiiioi X'UE_YearOE_yearqRe_yearLnW πδδδδδ +++++= 321
The main difference between these two equations is that the number of years of
formal education attained by worker i (year_Schooli), included as a regressor in
equation 3a, are disaggregated in equation 3b into years of required education
(year_Reqi) and years of overeducation (year_OEi) or years of undereducation
(year_UEi), that is:
year_Schooli = year_Reqi + year_OEi - year_UEi
Consequently,
year_OEi = year_Schooli - year_Reqi      if  year_Schooli > year_Reqi
year_OEi = 0, otherwise
year_UEi = year_Reqi - year_Schooli      if  year_Schooli < year_Reqi
year_UEi = 0, otherwise
The vector Xi  in equations 3a and 3b comprises the same control variables that in
equations 1 and 2.
Additionally, we also explore which theory explains better the educational returns in
the Spanish labor market.  This is done by testing the following two null hypotheses
from the estimation of equation 3b:
H0: δ1 = δ2 = − δ3
H0: δ2 = δ3 = 0
The first one analyses if all years of attained education have the same return, which
would suggest that the returns depend only on the number of years of education
completed by workers as predicted by human capital theory (Becker, 1962 and 1975;
Schultz, 1961). The second one analyses if the returns to the years of overeducation and
undereducation are zero, implying that only the education required by the job generates
returns as postulated by the job-competition theory (Thurow, 1975).
The estimation of all four wage-equations has been carried out using White’s
consistent estimators because of the possibility of a heteroscedasticity problem on the
error terms. Nonetheless, we consider that heteroscedasticity is not a relevant problem
in our sample according to the recommendations of Wallance and Silver (1988)4.
C. Results
Table 3 shows estimation results for equations 1, 2, 3a, and 3b.
Estimates from equation 1, in the first panel, show that underqualified workers face
wage penalties (-10.3%) compared with similar workers who are accurately matched in
qualification. This result implies that underqualification explains wage differentials
among workers with comparable personal, human capital and job characteristics, and
                                                          
4 The authors recommend to compare the estimated variance of the OLS estimator with that
corresponding to White’s consistent estimator.
with similar migratory and unemployment trajectory. However, overqualified workers
do not obtain higher nor lower wages than those who have similar characteristics and
are accurately match in qualification according to equation 1.
Estimates from equation 2 (second panel) show that workers mismatched in
education earn as much as comparable well-matched workers. So, we find that neither a
situation of overeducation nor of undereducation contribute to explain wage
differentials among workers with the same level of formal education in the Spanish
labor market.
The third and fourth panels in table 3 show the estimation results corresponding to
equations 3a and 3b, respectively. Results reveal that the rate of return to one year of
attained schooling differs from that corresponding to one year of required schooling,
suggesting that the rate of return depends on the accuracy of the education match. More
precisely, the return to one year of overeducation is positive (4.3%) but lower than that
corresponding to one year of required education (5.6%), whereas the return to one year
of undereducation is negative (-3.5%). However, the penalty for a year of educational
deficit is lower than the compensation for one year of required education. Thus,
educational mismatches explain some wage differences among workers with similar
jobs: overeducated workers would earn higher salaries than their well-matched co-
workers, and the opposite would happen to undereducated workers.
Finally, in table 4 we show that the Wald’s test rejects at 5% significance level both
null hypotheses related to the human capital theory and the job competition theory. By
rejecting the first hypothesis, we do not find support to the notion that all years of
attained education have the same return, such as the human capital theory postulates. By
rejecting the second, we do no find support to the idea that the returns to the years of
overeducation and undereducation are zero, as suggested by the job competition theory.
Our results here imply that the returns to education in Spain would depend both on the
education supplied by workers and on that required by jobs, predicted by the so-called
‘assignment theory’ (Tinbergen, 1956; Sattinger, 1975, 1980 and 1993; Hartog, 1981
and 1985).
IV. Non-monetary consequences of labor market mismatches in
Spain
A. Background
Labor market mismatches, either in qualification or in education, reflect inefficiencies
in the allocation of resources in the economy. However, such inefficiencies may have,
as we have seen, negative, neutral or even positive monetary consequences for workers,
which highlights the need to go any more deeply into consequences of qualification and
education mismatches. That is why we analyse in this section its non-monetary
consequences. The estimation of the effects of labor market mismatches on job
satisfaction, after controlling for earnings, may help to shed light on the issue.
Rather surprisingly, the non-monetary consequences of labor market mismatches
have received little attention from researchers.  Regarding education mismatches, only
Herch (1991), and Battu, Belfield and Sloane (2000) have explored the non-monetary
effects. The former finds that overeducated workers and undereducated women are less
satisfied than those who have the required level of formal education; and the latter
concludes that the adequately educated workers have a premium on job satisfaction. On
the other hand, Allen and van der Velden (2001) and Green and McIntosh (2002)
analyse the effects of the two types of mismatches considered in this study. These find
that qualification mismatches decrease the probability of being very satisfied, while
education mismatches do not affect to job satisfaction of workers. In addition, Cabral
(2005) studies the effect of overqualification on four dimensions of satisfaction (pay,
job security, type of work and number of hours of work) and concludes that the
overqualification affects negatively to the probability of being completely satisfied in all
these cases.
B. Models
We analyze the non-monetary consequences of qualification and education mismatches
using three different measures of job satisfaction: satisfaction with overall job (SOJ),
with the type of job (STJ), and with wage (SW). In each case we estimate the following
three models:
(4)                             Yi = ( ) iiiii X'UQOQSchool_Year εβββββΛ +++++ 3210
(5a)                           Yi = ( ) iiiii X'UEOESchool_Year μαααααΛ +++++ 3210
(5b)           Yi = ( ) iiiii X'UE_YearOE_YearqRe_Year πδδδδδΛ +++++ 3210
where Yi represents the corresponding level of satisfaction (SOJ, STJ or SW) for
individual i measured in an ordered scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6 (completely
satisfied), ( ).Λ  is the logistic probability function, and iε , iμ  and iπ  are random error
terms. Specifically, from equations 4 and 5a, we study the effects of mismatched labor
situations among comparable workers. This is why equations 4 includes as  explanatory
two dummy variables, OQi and UQi, which take a value of 1 when worker i is
overqualified or underqualified, respectively, and a value of 0 otherwise. On the other
hand, equation 5a comprises two dummy variables too, OEi and UEi, these take a value
of 1 when the worker is, respectively, overeducated or undereducated, and take a value
of 0 otherwise. Additionally, we analyze the effects of the size of education mismatches
among workers of similar jobs. To do so, we estimates the equation 5b, which includes
years of required education (Year_Reqi), instead of years of completed education
(Year_Schooli) as in previous equations, and the years of overeducation (year_OEi) or
the number of years of undereducated (year_OEi) corresponding to worker i. Vector Xi
contains control variables related to personal characteristics, human capital, professional
status, unemployment and migration of worker i as described in table A1.
All the equations proposed to analyze the non-monetary consequences of education
and qualification labor market mismatches are ordered discrete choice specifications, so
the signs of coefficient estimates indicate the direction of changes in probability for the
extreme levels of satisfaction; however, they show neither the variations in the
intermediate categories nor the size of the effects. For this reason, we also calculate the
predicted distribution of probabilities for satisfaction corresponding to a reference
individual5 and the predicted distribution when we alter marginally his characteristics
regarding qualification match and education match.
C. Results
In table 5, we show the main estimation results from the satisfaction equations related to
qualification mismatch, while in table 6 we translate them into predicted probability
distributions. From those, we notice that workers who are mismatched in qualification,
                                                          
5 Reference individual is a non-single man, wage-earner with tenure longer than ten years, working full
time in the private services industry as a clerck, service worker or shops and market sales worker, has not
been unemployed for 12 months in the past five years, was born in Spain and works in the same region
where he was born, is well matched, and his formal education (in equations 4 and 5a), the level of
required education in his job (in equation 5b), work experience, working hours, hourly wage and number
of unemployment episodes are the sample mean values.
both by surplus and by deficit, have lower probability of being completely satisfied with
their overall job, with the type of job that they have, and with their wage  than
comparable workers who are accurately matched in qualification. In addition, these
probabilities are lower for underqualified workers.
In table 7 and 8, we present, respectively, estimation results from the satisfaction
equations regarding education mismatches, and the predicted probability distribution
emerging from them.  In this way, we find that overeducated and undereducated
workers do not differ significantly regarding job satisfaction of similar workers who are
accurately matched. However, we find an exception since workers with educational
deficit in their job have a higher probability of being completely satisfied with type of
job that they develop, than those who have similar characteristics, included the same
level of formal education, and are accurately matched. On the other hand, the results
show that the years of educational surplus in a job affect negatively the probabilities of
being completely satisfied with overall job and, more specifically, with the type of job.
These results imply that overeducated workers have lower probability of being fully
satisfied with their jobs than their accurately matched co-workers. However, we find
that overeducated workers do not differ significantly on the probability of being fully
satisfied with wage compared to their accurately matched co-workers. Regarding the
years of undereducation, the results show that they increase the probabilities of being
completely satisfied with overall job and, more specifically, with the wage. So, in
general, undereducated workers appear to have higher probabilities of being completely
satisfied with their jobs than co-workers that have the required education. However, the
former does not differ from the latter on the probability of full satisfaction with the type
of job.
V. Synthesis and Implications
In this paper we have analysed the incidence and the consequences,
both monetary and non-monetary, of education and qualification mismatches in the
Spanish labor market. Nevertheless, our purpose is not only to study the mentioned
matters, but also we want to evince that both types of job/worker mismatches are
different phenomena; so, they should not be treated as equivalent, as it has been done in
most of the previous literature.
Looking at the joint distribution of education and qualification mismatch job
situations, we find that only 36% of workers have the same kind of classification under
both criteria, which implies that education and qualification mismatches are different
aspects of the so called job/worker match. Moreover, this implication is ratified because
the consequences for workers of both types of mismatches are also different.
Regarding monetary consequences, our study shows the following results: 1)
underqualification is penalised in wage, so this mismatch would explain wage
differential between workers with similar characteristics. However, overqualified
workers do not show wage differential with regard to those comparable workers
accurately match in qualification; 2) education mismatched workers obtain similar
wages in the Spanish labor market compared to those who have the same level of formal
education and other similar characteristics, and are accurately matched in education;  3)
educational mismatches explain wage differentials among workers with similar jobs;
more  specifically, the rate of return to one year of overeducation is positive, but lower
than the return to one year of required education, while the return to one year of
undereducation is negative.  This suggests that overeducated workers would earn higher
wages than accurately matched co-workers, while undereducated workers would earn
lower wages than well-matched co-workers. However, the penalization for one year of
undereducation is lower than the rate of return to one year of required education; 4) the
returns to education in Spain are better explained by the assignment theory than by
human capital or job competition theories because the rate of return appears to depend
on both the supply of and the demand of education in the labor market.
Regarding the non-monetary consequences of job/worker mismatches, our results
suggest: 1) qualification mismatches reduce workers’ satisfaction, which imply that
both overqualification and underqualification are undesirable situations from workers’
viewpoint; 2) education mismatches have neutral, in the case of overeducation, or even
positive in the case of undereducation, effects on job satisfaction for otherwise
comparable workers, including the same level of formal education. For this reason, we
conclude that, from comparable workers' perspective, non-monetary consequences of
education mismatches are at least as satisfactory as those related to educational accurate
match; 3) considering similar jobs, and so analysing jobs with the same required formal
education, we observe years of education mismatch have negative, neutral or even
positive non-monetary consequences for workers. The magnitude of overeducation has
negative effects on job satisfaction, specifically these ones could be explained by the
type of job that the workers develop. However, regarding wage, overeducated and
accurately educated co-workers have similar levels of job satisfaction.  On the other
hand, undereducation years have positive effects on job satisfaction, which can be
consequence of wage. It should be considered, in this regard, that the undereducated
workers have lower wages than those accurately matched co-workers, but wage penalty
for one year of undereducation is lower than the rate of return to one year of required
education.
In summary, the general implication of our analysis is that the research strategy of
using educational mismatches as proxy for the study of qualification mismatches, as
found in the literature, is far from accurate. Moreover, the qualification mismatch
emerges as a more relevant problem for workers with similar characteristics than the
educational mismatch, since the monetary consequences are neutral for overqualified
workers, but negative for underqualified ones, while these consequences are always
neutral for those who are educational mismatched. On the other hand, the non-monetary
consequences are always negative for qualification mismatched workers, while they
could be for educational mismatched comparable workers, and among similar jobs even
positive.
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Table 1. Means and Standard Errors of Variablesa Used in the Analyses
Mean Standard Error
OQ 0.35 0.48
UQ 0.45 0.50
OE 0.34 0.47
UE 0.28 0.45
Year_Req 9.63 3.56
Year_OE 1.22 2.14
Year_UE 0.90 1.71
Female 0.35 0.48
Single 0.31 0.46
Experience 22.52 12.51
Tenure shorter than 1 year 0.16 0.36
Tenure between 1 and 5 years 0.38 0.49
Tenure between 6 and 9 years 0.12 0.32
Year_School 9.95 4.03
Self-employed 0.16 0.37
Working hours per week 42.12 9.85
Part-time job 0.06 0.23
Public sector job 0.18 0.39
Agriculture job 0.06 0.24
Manufacturing job 0.33 0.47
Services job 0.61 0.49
Hourly wage 5.87 3.93
Occupation 1 0.20 0.40
Occupation 2 0.13 0.33
Occupation 4 0.04 0.19
Occupation 5 0.19 0.39
Occupation 6 0.10 0.30
Occupation 7 0.11 0.32
Unemployed for 12 months 0.17 0.37
Unemployed episodes 0.77 1.63
Regional migration 0.19 0.39
Lived abroad but returned 0.02 0.14
International inmigrant 0.02 0.13
SOJ
degree 1 0.02 0.15
degree 2 0.06 0.24
degree 3 0.16 0.36
degree 4 0.26 0.44
degree 5 0.38 0.48
degree 6 0.12 0.33
STJ
degree 1 0.02 0.15
degree 2 0.05 0.23
degree 3 0.13 0.34
degree 4 0.26 0.44
degree 5 0.36 0.48
degree 6 0.17 0.37
SW
degree 1 0.07 0.26
degree 2 0.15 0.36
degree 3 0.27 0.45
degree 4 0.28 0.45
degree 5 0.18 0.38
degree 6 0.04 0.19
a The definitions of the detailed variables are in the appendix.
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Table 2. Marginal and Joint Distributions of Qualification and Education Matches
Overeducated Undereducated Accurately educated
Qualification 
matches
Overqualified 13.9 8.1 12.6 34.6
Underqualified 13.9 13.7 17.4 45.0
Accurately qualified 6.0 5.9 8.5 20.4
Educational matches 33.8 27.7 38.5 100.0
Table 3. Monetary Consequences of Labor Market Mismatches: Main Estimated Coefficients
Experience 0.034 7.614 0.034 7.687 0.034 7.633 0.034 7.686
*** *** *** ***
(Experience)2/100 -0.050 6.201 -0.051 6.252 -0.050 6.130 -0.051 6.241
*** *** *** ***
Tenure shorter than 1 year -0.610 14.973 -0.617 15.213 -0.618 15.179 -0.616 15.221
*** *** *** ***
Tenure between 1 and 5 years -0.272 8.225 -0.275 8.349 -0.275 8.299 -0.275 8.359
*** *** *** ***
Tenure between 6 and 10 years -0.067 2.063 -0.071 2.196 -0.070 2.164 -0.071 2.192
** ** ** **
Year_School 0.041 8.674 0.049 8.006 0.044 9.298
*** *** ***
OQ -0.038 1.406
UQ -0.103 3.494
***
OE -0.021 0.715
UE 0.045 1.550
Year_Req 0.056 7.632
***
Year_OE 0.043 6.492
***
Year_UE -0.035 4.432
***
Equation 3bEquation 3aEquation 2Equation 1
0.000 0.000
Notes: absolut value of  t-statistic.  (*), (**) and  (***) indicate, respectively, significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
Adjusted - R2
P-value (Wald-stat.) 0.000 0.000
t-stat.
0.351
Wald-statistic 2556.443 2534.033 2526.261 2531.974
0.3490.3500.351
Coefficient Coefficient t-stat. Coefficientt-stat.Coefficientt-stat.
Table 4. Test of hypoteses from equation 3b
H0: δ1 = δ2 = -δ3
Chi-square: 6.609
P-value: 0. 037
H0: δ2 = δ3 = 0
Chi-square: 68.168
P-value: 0.000
Table 5. Non Monetary Consequences of Qualification Mismatches: Main Estimated Coefficients of  Equation 4
Year_School -0.057 -4.611 -0.035 -2.861 -0.023 -1.887
*** *** *
OQ -0.231 -2.883 -0.339 -4.247 -0.273 -3.484
*** *** ***
UQ -0.659 -7.929 -0.723 -8.672 -0.364 -4.484
*** *** ***
Dependent variable:  
SW
LR statistic ( 29 df)
Dependent variable: 
SOJ
394.979
Dependent variable: STJ
450.774
Coeffient Z-stat. Coeffient Z-stat. Coeffient Z-stat.
329.985
Notes:  (*), (**) and  (***) indicate, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
P-value (LR-stat.) 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 2 3 4 5 6
Reference individual 0.014 0.036 0.111 0.231 0.442 0.165
Year_School + std.e. 0.017 0.042 0.126 0.247 0.424 0.144
OQ 0.018 0.045 0.132 0.254 0.416 0.136
UQ 0.027 0.066 0.178 0.285 0.352 0.093
1 2 3 4 5 6
Reference individual 0.012 0.029 0.084 0.216 0.416 0.243
Year_School + std.e. 0.013 0.033 0.095 0.232 0.409 0.217
OQ 0.016 0.040 0.111 0.254 0.393 0.186
UQ 0.024 0.057 0.147 0.289 0.349 0.134
1 2 3 4 5 6
Reference individual 0.058 0.132 0.278 0.312 0.184 0.036
Year_School + std.e. 0.063 0.141 0.286 0.305 0.172 0.033
OQ 0.075 0.160 0.300 0.288 0.150 0.028
UQ 0.081 0.170 0.306 0.278 0.139 0.026
Table 6. Non Monetary Consequences of Qualification Mismatches: Predicted 
Probabilities from Equation 4
Note: std.e. indicates  standard error
Dependent Variable: SW
Dependent variable: SOJ
Dependent Variable: STJ
Table 7. Non-Monetary Consequences of Education Mismatches: Main Estimated Coefficients of Equations 5a and 5b
Equation 5a z-stat. Equation 5b z-stat. Equation 5a z-stat. Equation 5b z-stat. Equation 5a z-stat. Equation 5b z-stat.
Year_School -0.032 -2.242 -0.006 -0.427 -0.017 -1.198
**
OE -0.021 -0.282 -0.042 -0.571 0.020 0.277
UE 0.084 1.061 0.140 1.756 0.050 0.639
*
Year_Req -0.023 -1.481 0.004 0.255 -0.015 -0.968
Year_OE -0.036 -2.236 -0.036 -2.196 -0.005 -0.317
** **
Year_IE 0.060 2.927 0.016 0.818 0.042 2.092
*** **
LR statistic (29df)
P-value (LR stat.)
'Notes:  (*), (**) and  (***) indicate, respectively, significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
Dependent Variable: SOJ Dependent Variable: STJ Dependent Variable: SW
261.426 323.147
0.000
263.263
0.000
320.844
0.000 0.000
430.206
0.000
431.872
0.000
Table 8. Non Monetary Consequences of Education Mismatches: Predicted Probabilities from Equations 5a and 5b
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Reference Individual 0.021 0.053 0.150 0.265 0.391 0.120 0.021 0.052 0.149 0.264 0.392 0.121
Year_School + std.e. 0.024 0.059 0.164 0.274 0.371 0.107
OE - - - - - -
UE - - - - - -
Year_Req - - - - - -
Year_OE = 1 0.022 0.054 0.153 0.267 0.387 0.117
Year_UE = 1 0.020 0.050 0.143 0.260 0.401 0.128
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Reference Individual 0.019 0.046 0.124 0.266 0.376 0.169 0.018 0.044 0.119 0.260 0.382 0.177
Year_School - - - - - -
OE - - - - - -
UE 0.017 0.041 0.111 0.252 0.390 0.190
Year_Req - - - - - -
Year_OE = 1 0.019 0.045 0.122 0.264 0.378 0.172
Year_UE = 1 - - - - - -
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Reference Individual 0.076 0.162 0.301 0.286 0.148 0.028 0.077 0.163 0.301 0.285 0.147 0.027
Year_School - - - - - -
OE - - - - - -
UE - - - - - -
Year_Req - - - - - -
Year_OE = 1 - - - - - -
Year_UE = 1 0.074 0.158 0.298 0.289 0.152 0.029
Notes: (-)  indicates that estimated coefficient corresponding to that is not significative at 10% significant level
Equation 5a Equation 5b
Dependent Variable: SW
Equation 5a Equation 5b
Dependent Variable: SOJ
Equation 5a Equation 5b
Dependent Variable: STJ
Appendix
Table A1. Definition of Variables Used in the Analyses
OQ Dummy variable, 1 if worker is overcompetent, 0 otherwise
UQ Dummy variable, 1 if worker is undercompetent, 0 otherwise
OE Dummy variable, 1 if worker is overeducated, 0 otherwise
UE Dummy variable, 1 if worker is undereducated, 0 otherwise
Year_Req Number of years of required education in a job
Year_OE Number of years of overeducation in a job
Year_UE Number of years of undereducation in a job
Female Dummy variable, 1 if male, 0 otherwise
Single Dummy variable, 1 if single, 0 otherwise
Experience Number of years of potencial work experience (age-education-6)
Tenure shorter than 1 year Dummy variable, 1 if tenure is lower than 1 year, 0 otherwise
Tenure between 1 and 5 years Dummy variable, 1 if tenure is between 1 and 5 years, 0 otherwise
Tenure between 6 and 10 years Dummy variable, 1 if tenure is between 6 and 10 years, 0 otherwise
Year_School Number of years of formal education completed
Self-employed Dummy variable, 1 if self-employed, 0 otherwise
Working hours per week Average number of working hours per week
Part-time job Dummy variable, 1 if  part-time job, 0 otherwise
Public sector job Dummy variable, 1 if job in the public sector, 0 otherwise
Agriculture job Dummy variable, 1 if  agriculture job, 0 otherwise
Manufacturing job Dummy variable, 1 if manufacturing job, 0 otherwise
Services job Dummy variable, 1 if  service industry job, 0 otherwise
LnW Natural logarithm of hourly  wage
Occupation 1 Dummy variable, 1 if job in occupation 01 or 02 of ISCO88, 0 otherwise
Occupation 2 Dummy variable, 1 if job in  occupation 03 of ISCO88, 0 otherwise
Occupation 4 Dummy variable, 1 if job in occupation 06 of ISCO88, 0 otherwise
Occupation 5 Dummy variable, 1 if job in occupation 07 of ISCO88, 0 otherwise
Occupation 6 Dummy variable, 1 if job in occupation 08 of ISCO88, 0 otherwise
Occupation 7 Dummy variable, 1 if job occupation 09 of ISCO88, 0 otherwise
Unemployed for 12 months Dummy variable, 1 if worker unemployed for 12 months in the last 5 years, 0 otherwise
Unemployment episodes Number of unemployment episodes in the last 5 years
Regional migration Dummy variable, 1 if worker was not born in the region where he/she lives
Lived abroad but returned Dummy variable, 1 if worker born in Spain, lived abroad, and come back, 0 otherwise
International inmigrant Dummy variable, 1 if worker is a foreing inmigrant, 0 otherwise
SOJ Ordered variable  from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6 (completely satisfied) to indicate the satisfaction with overall job
STJ Ordered variable  from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6 (completely satisfied) to indicate the satisfaction with type of job
SW Ordered variable  from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6 (completely satisfied) to indicate the satisfaction with wage
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